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The, last four years have brought us back with the impact
of a sudden blow to the consciousness that we still live in
history; that our generation is but one of a long sequence
leading back to the beginning of human destiny. Only a
few years ago most of us seemed to believe that history was a
thing of the past, and that we had cut loose from it; that we
lived in a brave new age wholly different from those which
had gone before; that the new ways of life we had devised
had created a new mind and new modes of thought and new
attitudes which made us no longer amenable to the forces
that had hitherto been at work in human affairs.
It was therefore with a good deal of a shock that we were
rudely awakened to the realization that events were happening in our new age substantially like others that from time
out of mind had repeated themselves through the centuriesthings we had supposed would never happen again and for
which we were mentally quite unprepared. From that shock
many, perhaps most, of us have not yet recovered. Our
thinking is still confused and we have yet to regain the
fortitude and ~ssurance which depend on understanding that
we are only confronted with situations which men have
faced in the past and will have to face again.
The war has already exhibited one fact of which historical
generalization might have given us reasonable assurance. I
refer to the magnificent self-defense of England during the
whole year when she stood alone against the might of Hitler's
power, and with spirit unbroken successfully resisted the
most terrific attack in the records of warfare. From the time
of Rome's resistance to Hannibal down through Napoleon's
wars, it has become evident that successful self-defense in

warfare depends as much on national character as success in
life depends on personal character. In speaking of national
character I do not, of course, refer to unfounded theories
about race and blood; I refer to mental attitudes, determinations, inhibitions, which characterize the preponderance of
individuals who compose a nation. Of national character in
this sense, a large part consists in tradition or inherited attitudes, for character is a thing of slow growth; it is not character if it is something that springs into existence overnight.
Tradition is to national character what habits are to personal
character; and as personal character is not formed in a day
or a year, so national character is not formed in one or two
or three generations. It is tradition which binds the generations together into the character that gives strength for the
present and the possibility of growth for the future; for the
nation that is always changing its ways of life and its views
of life has nothing on which to build a future. It may have a
blueprint, but it has no foundation.
It is especially appropriate to refer to this matter of national tradition at Williamsburg, because we stand here at the
source and fountainhead of our American tradition. Here in
the age of Anne, when this town was a new development,
and the Capitol and Governor's palace were under construction an.d Colonel Byrd and Governor Spotswood walked
these streets, there were first exhibited on American soil
the large enterprise, the executive management, the confident
building for the future, the opportunity to produce in two
or three generations a breed fit for government and leader, ship, which have ever since been characteristic and fruitful
traits of American national life.
As the efforts of scholars bring to light in increasing measure the records of the Virginia tidewater in the age of Anl)e,
the great age of Williamsburg, it becomes apparent that a
modern American would have been far more at home with
Colonel Byrd or Robert Carter or Thomas Lee, would have
understood them and recognized his own type of life in theirs
to a far greater degree, than in the case of their New England
contemporaries, or even their contemporaries of New York
or Philadelphia. And here we also stand at the fountainhead
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of our special American tradition of government through
law; that tradition which, drawn from English sources and
built on the teachings of Locke and Somers and Holt, was
developed first by Wythe and afterward by his pupil, John
Marshall, greatest of all lawyers ancient or modem, into the
ultimate philosophy of free government.
It is well that Americans from all parts of the country
come here to Williamsburg to admire the architecture and
the interior decorations and the furniture. It should improve
their taste and do something to prepare their minds for the
attitudes and values and standards of judgment with which
these external things are in conformity, and of which they
were the outward expressions. But the thing of greatest
value, if we would carry forward our national tradition and
thereby strengthen the national character of which that tradition is at the heart, is the mental atmosphere which prevailed here, and which, spreading westward and northward
and southward, came to consti~ute the quintessence of the
American way of life as we have known it through the
better part of two centuries.

I.
It may therefore be of interest as well as timely to inquire
into a recent and now widely prevalent attitude toward an
important phase of this American way of life. I refer to the
phase of it which is represented by its sense of personal
responsibility, the high value it set on industry and enterprise
and on the willingness of individuals to take risks and abide
by the results, and its emphasis on home, family life and the
, duty of founding a family of well equipped and enterprising
descendants.
This view of life carried with it by necessary implication
a philosophy of government. To that philosophy in its main
outlines, all parties and factions among our people, however
great their differences on other points, have staunchly adhered
until very recently. The essence of that philosophy was
that the function of government is to promote and foster in
human individuals the attitudes and qualities I have just described, to create and protect free scope for the exercise
[ 5]

of those qualities, and otherwise limit itself to arbitrating differences between individuals and groups which have passed
beyond a certain pitch of intensity. In short, the building
of the nation was to be the work of countless individuals,
striving, planning, toiling, competing and cooperating, and
not the work or responsibility of government. This was
thought to be democratic, because the energy, the initiative,
the intelligence came from below, from anywhere and everywhere among the people at large, and not from above, from
the limited circle of government officials.
Today this phase of our national tradition is being brought
into question. It is pointed out that in many ways our mode
of life has been revolutionized since Colonel Byrd and Governor Spotswood walked in Duke of Gloucester Street, or
even since the covered wagons made their dusty way along
the Santa Fe Trail only a hundred years ago. The frontier
has disappeared, the country has filled up. We have
the railroad, the telephone, the airplane, the wireless, annihilating space and bringing distant places together. The great
inventions have resulted in mass production, and mass production has been made possible only by the growth of giant
corporations which tower, it is said, over the life of the
country, although in a relative point of view perhaps hardly
so much as the great families of Virginia towered over Williamsburg in the age of Anne and the Georges.
Nevertheless it is pointed out truthfully that these modem
developments have been fraught with possibilities of enormous economic disorder, that these possibilities have in recent
years become actualities, that at times millions of people have
been unable to find work, that the savings of other millions
have been wiped out by failure of their investments. It is
therefore suggested that the time is at hand for a large-scale
revision of our traditional conception of the duties and
responsibilities of government.
In the name of democracy and the common man it is urged
that this revision should take the direction of what is called a
planned society; a society where economic crises are avoided
and individuals are guaranteed security against idleness, want,
and fear by pla~ing the nation's economy under government
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planning. It is pointed out that many of our troubles under
a regime of large-scale industry have proceeded from improperly directed and un-coordinated effort. Manufacturers
have produced more of an article than they could find a
market for, and in consequence have had to shut their plants
and throw their employees out of work. Others by the use
of borrowed capital have built plants for which there was no
need, have therefore defaulted in paying their debts, and so
have brought ruin to banks and investors. These maladjustments are due, it is said to defective coordination between
the parts of our national economic machine, which can be
cured and should be cured by proper planning; and necessarily such planning must be the task of the central government as the only agency having an over-all view of the life of
our people as a whole.
This argument for coordination and planning carries a
strong appeal to both reason and sentiment. It seems entirely
rational that human effort should be productive and not selfdefeating, that the wastes incidental to un-coordinated effort
should be eliminated, and that there should be the same adjustment of tasks and resources in the national household
which characterizes a well-ordered private household.
The appeal to sentiment and humanitarian feeling is even
stronger. We have seen so much misery caused by no fault
of the sufferer that we feel a sense of moral obligation to
further any policy which promises alleviation. We feel that
the problem is urgent, that it is one about which something
must be done and done promptly. We find no comfort in
the observation that, comparing the large-scale economy of
our own time to the relatively smaller-scale economies of the
past, maladjustments and resulting want are in fact not so
great today as they once were under more primitive conditions. Such an answer fails to satisfy, because today the
social conscience is keener, our sense of human obligation is
more compelling; and for these reasons the argument for
socialized planning carries a strong appeal.
There are other considerations which enhance the appeal.
For one thing there is the appeal of novelty, always strong
and especially so today. Planning is presented as something

called for, made necessary by, and especially adapted to, the
new conditions of life of which we are today so acutely selfconscious. The achievements of chemistry and electricity
have so thoroughly convinced most of us that we live in an
entirely new world that it seems only appropriate to adopt a
new conception of government, irrespective of other reasons.
Again there is the attitude with which, as a result of our
participation in the war, we view our heroic allies, the Russian people. The magnificent stand they have made against
the invaders of their homeland has evoked to the full the
generous American spirit of admiration for resistance to
oppression. But the Russians have lived for years under the
nearest thing to a completely planned economy that has been
known in the modern world; and it is only natural to infer
that this must be largely, if not completely, responsible for
the magnificent strength and prowess they have so unexpectedly displayed. There are doubtless many who cannot help
feeling that the case for a planned economy has been proved
on the battlefields of Stalingrad and Smolensk.
Finally it is obvious that to some extent and in some degree
there has always and everywhere been a certain amount of
governmental planning. The very idea of government carries with it a recognition of the need for centralized authoritative public action to introduce into human relations kinds of
order and regularity and organization that would not exist
otherwise.
The principle thus admitted, what valid ground, it is asked,
can be put forward to limit its application? As regulation
has in recent years extended step by step from one thing to
another, this has usually been because the prior regulation
could not accomplish its purpose unless additional matters
were brought under government control. So much is already
determined by governmental policy that it has come to be
accepted that many private rights are no longer enjoyed save
on government sufferance. To that extent what used to be
called socialism is already with us. Government already has
the responsibility for so much of the national life that it
cannot successfully discharge that responsibility unless it is
made completely responsible for the whole. This of course
[ 8]

entails the frank admission that the individual has no rights,
legal or otherwise, against government, and so may be said actually to belong to the government; but this, it is said, need
cause no fear because government will be democratic government, devoted to the public interest and the welfare of the
common man.
The last argument which I have just outlined makes a
planned economy seem inevitable as only the necessary
further consequence of steps already taken and which cannot be retraced. The argument has the merit of bringing out
that planned economy like everything else is a matter of
degree, of more or less. Its fallacy lies in assuming that because we have a certain amount of a thing we ought necessarily to have more of it. Often the contrary may be true.
A thing may be advantageous to a point and beyond that
point deleterious. Most human decisions consist in finding
some satisfactory middle point between extremes; and certainly a planned economy in the sense in which it is being
urged is extreme because it contemplates total and complete
subjection of all individuals within a state to whatever purposes and directions government as the planning agency may
choose to give to any or all of their actions and resources.
They must be ready to do or not do whatever government
orders, since otherwise there would not be and could not be
planning of the kind represented as necessary.
In view of the obvious variance between a planned society
of this kind and our traditional American conception of government, it seems not inappropriate here at Williamsburg, at
the fountainhead of that tradition, to indulge in a brief inquiry
as to what, if anything, experience has to tell us concerning
the workings and results of planned societies. Possibly there
are blind irresistible forces at work which will transmute us
into such a society whether we will or no; but the surest
way to create such forces is to believe that they exist. It is
worthwhile to reason about public affairs at all only on the
supposition that the people have some choice about them;
and to stop reasoning about them is an effective way of
destroying that possibility of choice.

Assuming, then, that it is not yet too late for reason to have
some share in determining whether we are to have a planned
society, it should be of interest to become acquainted with
the relevant information; and since we are once more aware
of history, and that we are living and acting in history, it
may be in point to remind ourselves that history is the only
laboratory of political knowledge and the only source of
experience to which men can tum for information about
political affairs.

II.
Leaving trivial and relatively incomplete instances out of
account, there are available for observation five major examples of what is today called a planned society-that is to
say, one in which land and other natural resources, and the
labor and activities of the population, are all disposed of in
ways directed by the State. In view of the conception of
socialized planning as something necessitated by our special
modem conditions of large-scale technology, it is interesting
to note that the first, and in some ways the most complete,
example of a planned society is the earliest and oldest state
known to history, Egypt of the Pharaohs. For more than
three thousand years, from the dawn of recorded time with
occasional lapses and interruptions, the disposition of all the
land in the lower Nile Valley and the occupations of practically all its working inhabitants were dictated by government. We can only guess at the reasons for this, but they are
tolerably clear. The rich lands of the valley could be made
to produce their maximum yield only by a system of organized irrigation which called for highly centralized management. The product being at the disposal of government was
stored in good years for consumption in lean years, as we are
told in the story of Joseph.
Under this system surplus food and labor were available
in such quantities that they could be employed for centuries
in the gigantic public-works project of pyramid-building.
Doubtless without the system many inhabitants of Egypt
would have lacked the assurance of food and shelter which
the system gave them, and which drew the children of Israel
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to the proverbial Egyptian fleshpots. The inhabitants of
Egypt had a security which contrasted favorably with the
uncertain life of the desert Bedouins. But for this security
they paid a price-subjection to the lash of the taskmaster;
and the one fact about ancient Egyptian life which has
burned itself most deeply into the consciousness of later generations is that God heard the bitter cry of sorrow which
went up by reason of the taskmasters, and promised to deliver
His people out of the hand of the Egyptians.
Ancient history offers one other outstanding example of a
completely planned or managed society-that of Sparta. Certainly Sparta had no fleshpots, but her aim was nevertheless
security, although of a different kind. In Sparta it was the
poverty of the soil and not its richness which brought about
the managed state. Population had to be kept down and there
was compulsory exposure of infants. The tillers of the soil;
the Helots, were slaves of the State subject to be worked,
punished or liquidated as the discretion of the government
determined.
The soldiers were the citizens, the ruling caste with a voice
in government. They were permitted to own land, but could
neither sell their lots nor buy others, and they were made to
contribute their surplus produce to the public tables at which
all male citizens were required to feed. No citizen was allowed to possess any precious metal or engage in any remunerative occupation. His entire time had to be spent in drilling, or in sports preparatory for war. No one was allowed
to enter or leave the country without a permit. Food, dress,
architecture, music were regulated and the knowledge of
reading and writing was discouraged. Home life was rendered almost impossible. Children were reared in public
barracks and domestic ties were negligible. In Plutarch's
words, the Spartans were accustomed to regard themselves as
bees, simply members and parts of one common whole, for
which they lived rather than for themselves. 1
The end to which this discipline and management were
directed was to maintain a powerful army in a very poor
1

Plutarch, Lycurgus, c.

25.
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country with few natural resources. This objective was so
successfully attained that for several centuries the military
power of Sparta was able to overawe Greece. Her success
converted some Greek thinkers who lived in freer and more
prosperous countries to the superiority of a managed society,
and Plato's Republic is still the most convincing textbook on
social planning. The way of life at Sparta appealed to the
speculative mind, but Greeks of a more practical cast of
thought remarked that it was not surprising that the Spartans
faced death so bravely in battle, since a way of life such as
theirs was scarcely preferable to death. 2
Obviously neither the Egyptian nor Spartan planned societies resulted in the kind of social order or individual lives
that modern proponents of planning proclaim as their goal.
Today planning is urged as a way to bring about a fuller and
happier life for individuals, and a greater measure of security
from want and fear. In a sense Egyptian and Spartan plans
did accomplish just these results, but they did not do so in a
way that specially appeals to the modern mind-to the minds
of men accustomed to aspire to the enjoyment of material
things and habituated to the vocabulary of freedom and
personal self-expression. To find plans more congenial to
our own mental climate we must come down to more recent
planning experiments.
There have been many attempts at some kind or degree of
planning in the last three or four centuries, but most of them
have to be passed over in a brief survey like this as either confined to too small a local area, like the medieval rule of the
guilds, or as not sufficiently totalitarian in the scope of their
grasp on the nation's life. This is true, for example, of the
so-called mercantilist economic philosophy, which guided the
statecraft of most nations for a number of centuries and
involved a good deal of government planning, but was primarily limited to the field of foreign-trade relations. Again
the French experiment in building a completely planned
colonial society under the old regime in Canada was on too
small a scale to afford a basis for generalization. The first
2

Athenaeus iv, 15.
[
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large-scale modern experiment in total planning was an incident of the French Revolution.
In 1793 when the Jacobin faction came at last into power
it undertook to extend earlier measures of State control into
a widespread scheme of governmentally directed economy.
More than half the land and moneyed capital in the nation
was, or had already 1;>een, confiscated and brought under government ownership. Property of any and every kind was
subjected to requisition by the government at whatever price
it chose to pay. Banks and financial corporations were abolished. All prices were fixed at artificially low levels for the
benefit of the poor. All incomes above very low minima were
confiscated by taxation and the proceeds turned over to committees of philanthropy to improve the condition of the poor.
Manufacturers and merchants were required under pain of
death to continue in business at a loss until their funds were
finally exhausted. A program of forced labor was introduced
under which artisans, mechanics and farm laborers were
forbidden to leave their occupations or were required to
work at government direction.
The French revolutionary experiment in national planning
did not have an opportunity to work itself out into a developed and settled national policy. It soon went to pieces
when the faction which supported it lost control as a result
of their excesses during the Reign of Terror. The experiment is important chiefly because of its proclaimed purpose
of benefiting the poor, a purpose which underlies most of the
modern appeal of planning, and also because it developed
measures and techniques which have a striking affinity to
some of those adopted in the two great planning experiments
of our Qwn time, the Russian and the German.
The Russian experiment antedates the German by more
than a decade. In origin, in proclaimed purpose, in program
and techniques the two regimes have displayed notable differences. One originated in an uprising of the working class,
the other drew much of its original strength from a desire to
resist the workers. The Russians professed to pursue only
the welfare of the workers and to make war on the so-called
"bourgeoisie"; Hitler professes to seek the general good of
[ I3 ]

the whole German people and to aim at establishing a people's
community, a "Volksgemeinschaft." _The Russians proceeded
at once to confiscate all land and productive wealth; Hitler
has not disturbed the title to private property, but has contented himself with complete control over its use. And there
are other differences as well, in the motives to which the two
governments have appealed, in the form which their propaganda has taken, and in the different scapegoats which they
have selected to solidify their emotional hold on their subjects.
In spite of these differences, however, both the Russian
and German experiments in planning have shown certain
striking similarities in methods and results. Some of these
may have been due to Hitler's deliberate imitation of the
Russians. Others seem to reflect the normal and natural
workings of a planned economy. If two movements, starting
from such different points of origin, professing such different
objectives, and resembling each other only in the one particular of total planning, eventuate in identical or similar results,
it would seem to follow that there is something in the task
and conditions of national planning which produces those
results. This conclusion will be fortified if similar results
are observed in the planned economies of the past.

III.
The first outstanding characteristic of all planned economies is that political authority or government is necessarily highly concentrated and centralized in a very few
hands. In other words, not merely must the government
have full and complete power to dispose of all persons and
property so as to carry the plan into execution, not merely
must all individuals therefore be without rights against the
government, but the government itself must be so concentrated that it can formulate, and if necessary · alter, its plan
promptly, decisively apd firmly, without delay, controversy
or friction. The whole idea of a plan requires that it shall
be consistent and continuous. This means that it cannot be
made subject to daily fluctuations and differences of opinion
[ 14 ]
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or purpose, or it would cease to have the advantages of a
plan; it would become merely a succession of possibly inconsistent and contradictory governmental fiats. Accordingly in
a planned community government cannot be a debating
society and cannot even have in its controlling membership
a large enough number of persons to develop conflicting
views that Inight be difficult to reconcile. If such a condition
develops, it therefore inevitably results in the expulsion of the
dissenters through a purge or otherwise.
This characteristic of government in all planned societies
has been especially apparent in the modern experiments,
where there has been a greater tendency than in Egypt or
Sparta for a variety of different views and opinions to
obtrude themselves. These have necessarily been rigorously
suppressed. Subordination to a unified purpose has been so
emphasized as to be identified with the kind of liberty that
the plan is supposed to promote. "We will make France a
cemetery rather than not regenerate it in our own way,"
declared a spokesman for the Jacobins. 3
The devices by which this concentration of power has
been achieved have not been dissimilar. In revolutionary
France the Jacobin clubs which constituted only a very small
proportion of the adult population rigorously excluded all
others by force from participating in the government. The
Jacobin deputies who constituted only a Ininority of the
members of the Convention prevented the rest from having
a voice in its decisions. Gouverneur Morris, a contemporary
observer, reported that "the present government is a despotism. The Convention consists of only a part of those who
were chosen: These after putting under arrest their fellows
claim 1111 power and have delegated the greater part of it to a
Committee of Safety."4
The similarities to the organization of the Russian government are obvious, with one important exception. In the first
place even theoretical participation in government is denied
in Russia to all save members of the Communist Party, which
SH. A. Taine, French Revolution, (Eng. tr.), Vol. III, p. 61.
4 Morris to George Washington, October 18, 1793, in J. Sparks, Lite
and Correspondence ot Gouverneur Morris, Vol. II, p. 369.
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some years ago numbered less than two per cent of the adult
population. 5 Secondly the function of the party members is
limited to the election of an annual Congress which is a mere
ratification meeting to approve decisions of the party central
committee. At one meeting of this Congress an opposition
attempted to make itself heard with the result that the dissenters were subsequently sent to Siberia. 6 All real power is in
the hands of a subcommittee of the Party Central Committee,
the so-called Polit-buro, consisting of nine members, and
when there was an important difference in this Committee a
number of years ago four of the leading members were expelled and subsequently purged and liquidated.
The one respect in which Russia has proceeded beyond the
French Jacobins is to vest practically supreme power in the
hands of a single individual, the Secretary-General of the
Party, who is referred to as the vozhd or leader. The essential resemblance to the German form of organization is obvious. So essential is unity of purpose and control to the very
idea of planning that any other form of organization would
be unthinkable, and would defeat the whole purpose of a
planned society in any intelligible sense. It is therefore only
an evidence of confused thinking that so many humanitarian
liberals who welcomed the advent of planning in Russia displayed shocked amazement when the government which
emerged proved to be a centralized despotism. This was
necessary and inevitable once the premise of a planned society
is accepted.
A second necessary characteristic of a planned society is
that the central government must have in its service a sufficiently large corps of loyal and devoted dependents scattered
among the people to keep watch over their movements, report
on their reactions and ensure by all possible means their
obedience. This is essential to maintain the power which the
government needs if it is to perform its function. Doubtless
it would not be necessary if all human beings thought alike,
if all were motivated by pure reason and if all the decisions
of an absolute government were in conformity to reason.
5

w.

R. Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia, p.

700.

6 Batsell, op. cit., pp. 725-6.
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Needless to say this is not the c:ase, and absolute governments
whose decisions are certain to offend one or another element
in the population are no less zealous than other governments
to maintain themselves in power by whatever means are
most effective for suppressing opposition. These means take
various forms. One is to fill posts of influence and distinction
with loyal party adherents who are dependent on government favor and bounty. Another is the more sinister institution of a secret police vested with power of summary punishment. This institution is found in a fully developed form
in the Krypteia of ancient Sparta, whose task was to spy on
the Helots, and which on one occasion is said to have executed
two thousand of them in a single coup. Modern instances
which need no elaboration are the Gestapo in Germany and
the Ogpu in Russia.
The necessity of operating through an organization of political or party dependents leads to a third characteristic of
planned societies which has an important consequence for the
effectiveness of the planning itself and its execution. Today
the case for planning rests largely on economic considerations.
Modern well-being has come to be thought of so largely in
terms of economic goods and as so ultimately dependent on
production, distribution, employment and the like, that the
economic conception of planning is paramount. Accordingly
planning, in theory and as it is advocated, should give foremost consideration to purely economic efficiency. It is in
fact one of the chief arguments for a planned society that
such a society is able to do this more successfully than the
crude politically operated governments to which we have become accustomed.
The strength of this argument is seriously weakened by the
necessity to which I have just referred of maintaining loyal
party dependents in posts of power. This results in the management of the managed economy falling largely into -the
hands of a political class who have no industrial experience or
ability and who override the decisions of their technical subordinates for political purposes. This development has been
noted by all commentators on Germany and Russia. In Germany it is reported that every factory is in charge of a so-

called "factory-leader" whose position is said to be a contradictory one. While he is in charge of production, he is at
the same time a cog in the party machine and the party
authorities interfere with his management while holding him
responsible for filling his production program.
The same condition is reported in Russia. It is said that
the position of technical industrialists and production managers is difficult because they are everywhere working under
the orders of party men who know nothing about the enterprise they control, since their retention in their posts depends
not on knowledge or capacity, but upon being politically
reliable. When things go wrong these party representatives
always throw the blame on the specialists who work under
them, accusing the latter of being wreckers and counter-revolutionaries. 7 In at least one notable instance the technicians
were tried and convicted of sabotage for adhering to production estimates which subsequently proved to be correct.
Obviously the condition just described seriously impairs
the supposed effectiveness of planning to accomplish the results expected of it and which are urged in its justification.
There is an even more fundamental factor working in the
same direction. This arises from the necessity that in every
planned society the central authority must answer the question, what shall the plan be? There must be a certain amount
of concreteness in a plan, however broadly conceived, and if
there is to be actual planning rather than a mere acceptance of
the theory of planning, answers must sooner or later be found
for such very specific questions as, who is to get what? Who
is to give up what?
At this point difficulty begins. In a complex modern society with countless groups and interests making claims that
cannot all be satisfied, and often shifting their claims from
year to year, government, if it is to direct the economic process in accordance with a plan must assume responsibility for
making a final and conclusive determination of all such claims.
Doubtless this was not the case in such a simple society as
Sparta, where effectiveness in war was the sole objective of
the plan. Today it is inherent in the very economic situation7F, Utley, The Dream We Lost, p. 227.
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which is thought to create the need for planning. Usually an
effort is made to shove the difficulty into the background by
appealing to some general term like "public interest." Robespierre brushed the problem aside by proclaiming that "Our
sublime principle supposes a preference for public interests
over all private interests."8 The Russians say that their objective is to abolish the exploitation of man by man and establish a classless society. The Nazis announce that their goal is
the general good of the German people and the prevention of
individuals from furthering their private interests at the expense of society.
But th~ problem will not down in this way. "Public interest" and "general good" are phrases which serve to conceal
the competition of interests that goes on behind them. To
talk of a classless society is futile so long as different human
beings do different things which bring them into competition
or controversy. There is always a question as to whose interest for the moment is in accord with the supposed general
interest, and by what standard the general interest in specific
cases is to be judged. Everything depends on the kind of
considerations which are resorted to in giving an answer to
these questions.
.
If national planning has the merit it is supposed to have,
these fundamental questions must be answered, or at least an
attempt made to answer them, in an impartial spirit and from
the standpoint of a disinterested attempt to increase the
national product or the national productive capacity. That
this is by no means alw~ys the case is shown by what we hear
from Germany. Old-fashioned political considerations of a
familiar kind seem largely to govern. Thus we are told that
"the small shopkeepers have the least political influence and
make the easiest scapegoats when there is an unpopular rise
in prices. The price commissar has granted innumerable
price increases to manufacturers at the expense of retailers."9
In other words, the processes of logrolling and pressure-politics so familiar in popularly elected assemblies do not disappear
under a planned economy, but are merely driven back into
8 Taine, French R evolution (Eng. tr.),
9 G. Reimann, The Vampire Economy,
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the secret cabinet of the planning authority. One of the very
conditions which planning professes to remove is found to
persist under it. "Plus s:a change, plus c'est la meme chose."
But there is an even graver difficulty in every planned
society when the central authority is called on to decide what
is to be the goal of the plan. Most of the discontented groups
who welcome planning as a way of satisfying their desires
answer at once that it is to raise their standard of living, mak~
more economic goods immediately available to them, and
decrease the productive effort required of them. To accede
to these demands in full would be to sacrifice the future to
the present. Private capital, saving, and investment having
all been abolished, the maintenance and enlargement of the
national plant must necessarily be at the expense of the
present income of the workers. There must be compulsory
saving through something akin to taxation, the proceeds to be
invested in plant by the government. Accordingly one of
the largest, if not the largest, economic issue facing the government of a planned society in modem times is to decide
between the claims of the future and the present.
It is of interest that in making this decision both the Russian and German governments alike have strongly favored the
future; that is to say, they have diverted effort from making
consumers' goods, and have proportionately held down or
reduced the present standard of living, for the purpose of
building new plants and further increasing the supply of
producers' goods. This emphasis on plant expansion has been
the dominant feature of both the German and Russian economies. It is especially noteworthy because it represents on
the part of these socialist plans an exaggeration of one of the
very tendencies which advocates of planning have most severely criticized in capitalistic society-namely, the tendency
to subtract too large an amount from the current comforts
and pleasures of the present generation in the speculative hope
of producing more in the future. What has been called
"oversaving" was a leading charge in the indictment against
the functioning of free enterprise during the nineteen-twenties; yet "oversaving" in the same sense has nowhere been
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carried so far as in the planned economIes during the last
dozen years.
Indeed it was carried so far in Russia as practically to result
in famine conditions and in Germany to lead to the strictest
rationing of elementary comforts. The wisdom of such a plan
from both the social and economic standpoints is open to
question. Needless to say, it involves the risk of tremendous
wastes of effort from possible miscalculations and erroneous
predictions. In any event, to use a vivid phrase, the policy
involves "putting a steel hoop around consumption" ;10 and
"whether the immediate interests of the living generation are
unduly sacrificed to the hypothetical desires and needs of
generations yet to come is arguable."l1 It is at least clear that
under a planned economy operating on a program of this
character, which rigorously thwarts present appetites and
denies present satisfactions, there is an ever-present danger of
grave popular discontents. The possibility of these discontents, the chance that large bodies of people may not like the
government's plan or its results, is a thing with which all
planned societies have to reckon; and especially so in an age
like the present, when, even in Germany and Russia, public
opinion is a factor which cannot be completely ignored.
Accordingly one of the common characteristics of planned
societies has always been a strict control and regimentation
of opinion. In part this has taken the form of creating an
atmosphere and mental climate of fear through the unseen
but ever-present power of such institutions as the Krypteia,
the Ogpu and the Gestapo; in part there has been recognition
that opinion cannot be effectively controlled through repressive measures alone, but that it has to be moulded through
affirmative measures of suggestion, propaganda and mysticism.
This artificial moulding of a nation's mind to the requirements of the governmental plan through studied stimulation
of motives, emotions and attitudes is accordingly an outstanding characteristic of all planned economies. In ancient
Egypt it was accomplished largely through the dominance of
Friedman, Russia in Transition, p. 93.
E. Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution (London, 1938), pp.
343-345·
10 E.
11 L.
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a powerful state-religion whose priests and cults were at the
disposal of the government. The French Revolutionary government sought to achieve the same result by civic festivals,
fraternal banquets, "feasts of reason" and the so-called cult
of the Supreme Being. Substantially similar devices in Nazi
Germany are the Youth Movement, the marching parades,
the cult of "Strength Through Joy" and the religion of race;
while in Russia there have been introduced the deification of
Lenin and what amounts to a mystic worship of dynamos,
power-plants and tractors.
A darker aspect of this planned control over human attitudes is that it has been felt necessary by the governments of
planned societies to solidify the loyalty of their subjects, and
stimulate enthusiasm to the point of enduring the sacrifices
which the plan entails, by selecting as a scapegoat some element of the population against which the hatred of the rest
can be focused and concentrated. Antagonism and hatred
shared in common against a common object are unfortunately
among the most powerful and most readily available human
motives to produce mass cooperation and divert attention
from the inconveniences and suffering which such cooperation may require; and this has been soon learned and well
learned in every planned society of which we have knowledge. Each and all have been built largely around the motive
of punishing, persecuting and oppressing some hated group.
At Sparta it was the Helots; during the French Revolution the
aristocrats, emigres, and capitalists; in Nazi Germany the
Jews; and in Soviet Russia the bourgeois, the NEP men and
the Kulaks.
The persistent persecution of these classes has not only
given the rest of the population a sense of the necessity of
holding together for a common task, but has also inspired
them with a feeling of mastery and superiority which has
caused them to overlook their privations and, what is perhaps
even more effective, has stimulated in them a spirit of fanaticism and blind devotion to a cause or an "ideal" which has
inoculated them against the influence of more rational considerations. The extent to which emphasis has been placed on
motives of this kind is illustrated by the following report of
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the Russian persecution of the Kulaks, or well-to-do small
farmers. We are told that:
"In villages where there was a dead level of
poverty, the Soviets were nevertheless ordered to
find Kulaks even where none existed~ Some families
must be designated as such even if there were no
exploiters or usurers. Dr. Calvin B. Hoover relates
how, in one village where he visited, the local chairman of the Committee of the Poor exhibited to him
a family of. Kulaks quite in the manner of showing
one a family of lepers on whom the judgment of
God had fallen . . . . When the query was put as
to why the family was regarded as a Kulak one,
he replied that someone had to be a Kulak, and that
this family had many years before owned a village
inn. They no longer did so, but there was apparently no hope of their ever losing their status as a
Kulak family. If they did, there was no other family to take their place as Public Enemy, and for
some reason unknown to anyone, the Soviet Government insisted that each village must produce at
least one Kulak family to be oppressed."12
This characteristic of planned society in relying upon and
stimulating mass-hatred against an oppressed group is especially repugnant to the humanitarian and philanthropic urge
of our time from which so much of the demand for a planned
society proceeds. It is an ugly fact which most of us would
like to brush aside or stigmatise as peculiar to Germany. The
same thing is true of the depressingly low standards of living,
the starvation level of consumption, which have been necessitated by both the Russian and German plans and which an
effort is made to explain away as only incidental to getting
the plan into operation, as only a preliminary to the happy
new day that is to come in the future. What right have we,
asks an occasional disappointed liberal who expected much of
12 Utley, The Dream We Lost,
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the planning experiments, to impose all this suffering on the
generation of the living in the hope that our plan, or any plan
conceived and executed by any group of planners, will compensate for the wreckage by the supposed benefits it will
bestow on generations yet unborn? 13
We are thus brought to the question of the extent to which
planning, in the light of experience, has lived up to its promise
of performing the major task expected of it by its proponents
and urged as the principal reason for adopting it-the task,
namely, of controlling the operation of economic forces under
modern conditions of technology, avoiding and smoothing
out maladjustments, and ensuring an orderly and rational
relationship between production and use, supply and demand.
If a planned economy is instituted, to what extent can it be
expected that the national consumption will be accurately
anticipated and evenly matched by production, so that socalled "crises" will be avoided? In approaching this problem
a planned economy has one decided advantage. It has one
of the variables under its control-it can absolutely dictate
consumption by resorting, if necessary, to universal rationing.
In effect the planned economies have done this, so that their
only problem has been that of production, of compelling
enough to be produced to meet the consumption program,
high or low, which the government dictates without regard
for the desires, tastes and preferences of the people.
There has already been a sufficient length of experience in
the Soviet State to afford some basis for judgment as to its
success or failure in this direction. The experience of Germany 'has been more brief and little information is available.
In Russia, as might have been expected, there has all along
been difficulty in meeting production schedules. Plants have
been built in the wrong places with respect to raw materials
or transportation facilities, resulting in delayed output. Others have been built too large or too small for maximum efficiency. Inefficient management or political management has
slowed down production. Products composed of a number of
parts supplied by different plants have been held up because
13

Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, p.

[ 24 ]

203.

some of the parts could not be obtained in as large quantities
as others. Some industries have not been able to obtain sufficient raw materials.
Of course these things occur under the system of private
enterprise with which we are familiar. It is human to make
mistakes and businessmen make them with a certain amount
of damage, and often a very large amount of damage, to
others. But it is now clear that planners, and those upon
whom they depend to carry out their plans, also make them.
The difference is in scale, in degree. Where there is a number of completely separate private enterprises some may make
mistakes, while others do not, and a rough balance may be
struck for a great deal of the time. If an error is made in one
place it may be corrected somewhere else. A separate concern may repair its mistakes without involving a change of
national policy. On the other hand where the industry of a
whole nation is under central control and rigidly coordinated
as planning requires, a mistake anywhere may result in dislocation everywhere and apparently this has happened frequently in Russia and doubtless also in Germany.
Reporting on Russia, an English economist concludes that
planning has not eliminated economic crises, but has only
caused them to appear under somewhat different forms from
those to which we are accustomed. He says:
"Neither has the Soviet Union escaped crises,
different in form, but as expensive and disturbing as
the crises which occur in the unplanned economics
of capitalist states. Between 1928 and 1932 the
total head of domestic livestock declined by roughly
half; in the winter of 1932-1933 large agricultural
regions were visited by famine which resulted in
two million deaths. Some branches of national
economy have over-fulfilled their plans, while others have failed by considerable margins to realize
them .... In a capitalist system such circumstances
would result in insolvencies and unemployment in
the affected industries. Such external symptoms are
suppressed in the Soviet Union by price fixing and
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by budgetary grants to cover the unplanned losses
of industrial enterprises, but the disease is manifested
in other forms .... The ultimate result of planning
errors was a reduction in the consumption of the
population . . . .
"If an economic crisis be defined as an unpredicted disturbance in the orderly development of
production and consumption, resulting either in a
shortage of goods or a shortage of effective demand,
then the economic history of the Soviet Union, since
planning superseded the relatively free market of
N. E. P. has been a succession of crises, for at practically no period during that time has there not
been a shortage of something . . . . If planning is
immune from some of the defects of capitalism, it
seems to possess peculiar faults of its own."14
And another commentator concludes as follows:
"For years past there has been a far more general
anarchy in Soviet national economy than has ever
been the case in capitalist economy even at times
of worst crisis."15
In any event, whatever may be thought of the effectiveness
of planned societies in achieving economic efficiency and
eliminating economic crises, there is one direction in which
they have definitely proved their effectiveness, and for which
they have always displayed a pec~liar fitness. It is a kind of
effectiveness and fitness which is far removed from the professions and supposed objectives of the humanitarian liberals
who, in this country at least, are the leading proponents of
government planning. It is effectiveness and fitness for war.
All the planned, societies, ancient Egypt, Sparta, revolutionary
France, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, whatever their differences in other respects, have been powerful and effective
military states. For this there are obvious reasons.
14 L.

E. Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution, pp. 343-345.
The Dream We Lost, p. 205.

15 Utley,
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The chief human characteristic of planned societies is the
iron discipline to which their populations are and have to be
subjected. Whatever the character of the plan and whatever
the objectives it professes, the central directing authority
understands from the outset that an attitude of complete
unquestioning obedience by the people to the government
must be created as a preliminary requirement, and that the
principal effort of government must be devoted to creating
this attitude and sustaining it. Experience shows that this
can be done, and, if done effectively, the attitude persists no
matter how far the plan falls short in actuality of realizing
the promises and professions which constituted its original
appeal. Not merely is this attitude of complete obedience
highly valuable as an element of military effectiveness, but the
devices which are generally used to create and maintain it
have in themselves a military value. The parades, the festivals, the mystic attitude toward the state and its ruler, all tend
to produce a condition of mind which is valuable in war, and
this is especially true of the spirit of hate and fanaticism
against enemies or supposed enemies of the regime which we
have seen that the rulers of planned societies do so much to
stimulate. An attitude compounded of loyalty to the state
and mystic savage ferocity against other human beings, coupled with habituation to privation and sacrifice, produces a
generation of soldiers who may be almost irresistible for a
succession of campaigns.
It is therefore not remarkable that perhaps the fiercest and
most intense war in history is being fought out today between
the two great planned societies of modem Europe. The discipline, fanaticism and training in hardship which characterize
the combatants on both sides made them from their very
entry into the conflict foemen worthy of each other's steel.
Democracies always require two or three years to organize
themselves for battle; the discipline to which planned societies are inured makes them more effective from the outset.
If a nation has an ambition to find its chief satisfaction in military achievement, the acceptance of a planned regime is a
good way to begin.

IV.
In this brief review there have been summarized the common characteristics of planned societies so far as experience
and information are available. They are, first of all, an absolute government unlimited in its powers, concentrated in a
very few hands or in the hands of a single leader, and permitting no discussion or difference of opinion; secondly, the
filling of all posts of importance, economic and technical as
well as governmental, with loyal dependents of the party
machine; thirdly, the subtraction from the consuming power
of the people of enough of the total national product to
enable the government to make the capital investments and
experiments that it deems desirable, even though there may
thereby be entailed, and has hitherto always been entailed, a
serious depression of the standard of living; fourthly, a distribution of the consumable national income in part at least
along political lines to maintain support for the government;
fifthly, a rigid regimentation of opinion requiring resort to
the use of a secret police; sixthly, the mass hypnotism of the
people into a fanatical spirit of self-sacrifice, often stimulated
by the deliberate persecution of some oppressed group; and
finally, the development of an effective spirit and attitude
of militarism.
In the light of experience these are some of the results that
would most certainly be produced by transforming a nation
into a planned society. Of course they are not the results
that are desired and advocated by those among us who are
toying with the idea of planning, and who would almost certainly be liquidated if the planned society which they propose
came into being, just as most of the early Bolsheviks were
liquidated in due course. It is not the hard realities of a
planned society that appeal to the advocates of planning; it is
the feeling that something must be done to alleviate economic
depressions and give greater security and larger incomes to
the mass of the people. The actual experience does not indicate that a regime of government planning will do these
things; it certainly indicates that the planned regimes hitherto
known have not done them; and it suggests that the very
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· conditions of planning, the human agencies through which
it must operate and the special nature of the obstacles which
it must encounter, will prevent it from doing so.
The great defect in the panacea of planning is that 'it conceals problems and difficulties rather than solves them. In a
free economy, we are fully aware of the friction, the conflict,
the waste, the maladjustments that characterize the economic
and social relations between men and groups of men. They
are patent and their results in alternating periods of prosperity
and depression are patent. The advocates of planning assume
that by concentrating all power in a centralized agency, the
factors of maladjustment will be removed. They will not be
-they will disappear from the surface, only to be transformed
into pressures operating on the agency from within; and with
the additional difficulty of imposing upon the agency a
responsibility too vast for human executive ability and judgment. The central authority will inevitably seek to relieve
itself of this strain by exerting its power to repress the active
outside centers of initiative; and in doing so it will deaden the
life and intelligence which are necessary for high productive
effort and hence for a high standard of living. It substitutes
a mechanical military kind of discipline for the organic spontaneous cooperation which is necessary for the works of
peace.
But if planning will not solve the problem of our generation, where are we to turn? This is doubtless the question
that the considerations here advanced will evoke from the
thoughtful and earnest men and women who sincerely desire
a fuller and better life for our people. Of course it is a question which could not be answered in much more time than I
have already taken, and it is not the question I set out to
answer; all that I proposed was to eliminate one widely discussed way of working toward the desired result. However,
this much may be said:
There is often much that government can properly and advantageously do to alleviate particular evils as they develop
and disclose themselves in modern society. To this extent
it may be said that there is a helpful kind of government planning, but it is planning how to deal with an evil rather than

planning the arrangements of the society itself. If this kind
of governmental action is extended in too many directions
and to too many different problems at once it begins to suffer
from a kind of law of diminishing returns-the various governmental efforts get in each other's way. This is apt to lead
to a demand for still more governmental interference with
other things and to a demand for "coordination" of the various governmental efforts. Out of these demands comes in
turn the demand for a "planned society"-for vesting government with a complete general power of making all the social
and economic adjustments within the society that it regards
as necessary to accomplish its purpose.
This progression of ideas and tendencies from necessary
governmental interference with some things to complete governmental management of everything is so inexorable, particularly in the mental atmosphere and climate which prevail
today, that it becomes desirable to bring ourselves face to
face with what complete governmental management of society would mean. That is accordingly what I have attempted to do this evening. If when we look the prospect in
the face it is not pleasing, then there is certainly suggested the
conclusion that any proposal for an extension of the field of
governmental control and management should be viewed with
caution and that there is a presumption against it unless clear
proof can be given that it will not create more problems and
maladjustments than those which it promises to remove. Certainly the data of experience reviewed in what I have here
said permit no other conclusion than that governmental management, so far from eliminating the maladjustments which
irk us, is likely to produce other and even graver maladjustments of the same character; and this should make us at least
somewhat more tolerant and more patient of the maladjustments incidental to the regime of free enterprise in which we
have been bred.
Any system of free enterprise, just because it is free and
just because it permits and expects initiative and effort to
spring up in unexpected places and in unexpected ways from
anywhere and everywhere throughout the mass of the people,
is bound to result in a good deal of conflict and competition
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and disappointment and frustration and success and inequality. Success will not always be achieved by the most deserving, and failure is not always a stigma of incompetence.
The rewards of life, under any social or political system, individualist or commUJ)ist, are always partly the result of
chance and partly of rules of the game that are rough and
ready and do not recognize the finer values. Sometimes all
this competition and conflict and restless effort are drawn into
directions which result in wholesale frustrations, failures, destruction of accumulations and unemployment. Within limits there are things which government can do to alleviate the
resulting individual suffering and to lessen the likelihood of
its recurrence, but only within limits, whether we have a
planned society or not.
The maladjustments of life, economic, social and individual,
are in part the result of conflict between human aims and
purposes, in part of lack of foresight, lack of patience, lack of
intelligence, lack of skill. The real tragedies are wheI1 some
such lack on the part of one individual or a few individuals
brings frustration and suffering to many. This is always more
likely to happen as more power is concentrated in a few over
the many, and especially as more power is concentrated in
government; for the very essence of government is that the
force of its decisions is felt by all and its failures and mistakes
come home to all. A miscalculation by the absolute government of a planned society can produce results more disastrous
than a stock-market panic or a glut in the wheat-crop, or a
shrinkage in the demand for steel.
The argument for a planned economy assumes that government will be all-wise and wholly disinterested, conditions not
likely to occur; and it assumes also that the way to solve economic difficulties and social difficulties is to suppress and iron
out all conflicts and inequalities. Supposing that this could
be done, which it cannot be, the loss would be greater than
the gain; for it is precisely the conflicts, the competition, the
shifting inequalities in the mass of the people that contain
the hope of all progress and improvement and spell the
meaning of democracy.

Accordingly even if it could be proved that a planned
society would eliminate some of the particular things that we
feel today as evils in the system of free enterprise, we would
not do wisely to change one system for the other because of
all that we would lose; and in this connection there is a final
consideration which is not always given due weight. I referred at the beginning to national tradition as corresponding
in the body politic to character in an individual. A nation
attempting to step out of its tradition is like an individual
acting out of character. It leads to disintegration, ineffective~ess, paralysis of will, impotence of accomplishment. Neither
the German nor the Russian people in submitting to planned
economies stepped out of their traditions. Both had traditions of absolute government and social servitude. Both had
traditions of dominant militarism. They have merely translated their traditions into forms more effective for modern
purposes.
Our American tradition is a different one. It is a tradition
which vests initiative and decision in all individuals everywhere and calls the result democracy. It puts a man's fate at
the mercy of his intelligence and skill and therefore holds him
entitled to an education. It expects him to develop enterprise and therefore throws him on his own resources to find
and hold a job if he can. It believes in incentive rather than
compulsion and therefore insists that the right to acquire and
own prop~rty shall be protected. It abhors the idea of men
being supported by the government except in unusual emergencies. It recognizes that a system of free enterprise does
not automatically prevent booms and panics, but it believes
that these may also occur under systems of government dictation, and that in the long run their effects can be overcome
more satisfactorily by the efforts and decisions of thousands
and millions of men and women than by the wisdom of a
centralized government. This is the tradition which would
have been as well understood at Williamsburg in the age of
_ Queen Anne as by the men who are responsible for the operation of our industry today in North Carolina and Pennsylvania, in Illinois and California. It is the tradition which we
inherit from the Williamsburg period of our history.
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We have not always kept this tradition in mind in shaping
the course of our national policy, especially during the past
half-century, and therein lies the source of many of our present difficulties, especially those of the last twenty years.
Necessarily there have had to be some readjustmnts of governmental functions and some increase in governmental powers,
but the line has not always been wisely understood between
the things that government can advantageously do and those
in which its inter:ference means ultimate mischief. Indeed the
supposed collapse of our economy a dozen years ago was due
not so much to the operation of economic forces as to the
effect of the unwise governmental policies of prior years.
In the face of this, many of us have not yet learned our lesson
and are turning to more governmental interference as a cure
for the evils that too mu~h governmental interference has
caused. The point has at last been reached when some of the
more advanced advocates of reform are suggesting a planned
society with all that it involves.
But there is one thing upon which we may pin our hope of
turning back the tide. There is one point in which a planned
economy outrages the deepest layer of our tradition, and
which can be understood, I believe, by common men everywhere. A planned society is completely inconsistent with
government by discussion and debate, with free elections and
with legislation by representative assemblies. It does not
tolerate compromise. It necessarily insists upon absolutism,
upon supreme uncontrolled power in the ruler and his immediate coterie of adviser~. Without this, as I have already
pointed out,there can be no planned society, for a free legislature could upset the plan at any time and would certainly
do so.
I do not believe that the American people are ready to accept this kind of absolutism. We may no longer know our
history but hatred of absolutism is still in our blood and
bones, at least in those of us who are of English descent.
Our deepest roots go back to the time when England shook
off the last shackles of an absolute king. The age of Anne,
when Williamsburg was founded, was the dawn of that era
of freedom finally achieved. All our most treasured national
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memories ever since are linked with the onward march of
political freedom. We are not yet ready to turn back the
clock and plunge into the night that lies behind the Williamsburg dawn. Williamsburg and what it stands for still have
meaning for us. We are not yet ready to accept the Pharoahs
and the old kings:
"Over all things certain, this is sure indeed:
Suffer not the old King, for we know the breed.
,.,
,.,
,.,
,.,
,.,
,.,
,.,

,.,

He shall mark our goings, question when we came,
Set his guards about us, as in Freedom's name.
He shall take a tribute, toll of all our ware;
He shall change our gold for arms-arms we may not bear.
He shall break his judges if they cross his word;
He shall rule above the law, calling on the Lord.
He shall peep and mutter; and the night shall bring
Watchers neath our window lest we mock the King.
Hate and all division; hosts of hurrying spies;
Money poured in secret, carrion breeding flies.
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Here is naught at venture, random nor untrueSwings the wheel full circle, brims the cup anew.
Step by step and word for word; who is ruled may read,
Suffer not the old Kings; for we know the breed."
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